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U.S. MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROCUREMENT  
FOR THE 70'S, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Thomas L. Griffin, Jr.

Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

8 March 1972

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
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BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS L. GRIFFIN, JR.  
U.S. MARINE CORPS



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U.S. MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROCUREMENT FOR THE 70'S  
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS


AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by

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8 March 1972



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Abstract: This study identifies U.S. Marine Corps officer accession problems related to the all-volunteer service. The study covers procurement and accession problems specifically related to the four major accession programs: United States Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, Platoon Leaders Class, and Officer Candidate Class. These programs represent 85-88% of the projected accession requirements for the 1970's. Data was gathered using a literature search and personal interviews with Marine Corps procurement personnel. The implementation of an all-volunteer service and zero draft will cause officer accession problems. Acquiring quality officer accessions will be more difficult than acquiring the required quantity; but in order to meet both quality and quantity of manpower requirements, the four programs must receive maximum assistance from Headquarters Marine Corps and from the Corps in general. In a volunteer service, personnel management procedures must reflect USMC competition with other services and with industry for the limited available qualified talent. The author concluded that the Marine Corps should continue using the nation's colleges as the primary source of officer accessions, that new innovative procurement methods must be adopted to meet the challenges of the all-volunteer service, and that each officer, each marine, must be an active part of the recruiting team for tomorrow's Corps.

## PREFACE

This study was conducted as an individual student research project at the United States Army War College. The study investigates the procurement and accession problems related to the United States Marine Corps in an all-volunteer service during the 1970's. The assistance provided by Major Leonard A. Wunderlich, USMC, Headquarters Marine Corps, and Captain William C. Conrad, Jr., USMC, Officer Selection Officer, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, is most sincerely acknowledged.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Historically, officer selection or officer procurement, regardless of the terminology used, is and has been fundamental to the success of the Corps.<sup>1</sup>

This study will identify United States Marine Corps officer accession problem areas related to an all-volunteer service. The contradiction of opinions concerning the volunteer service, the expertise of many of those who express these opinions, and the importance of officer procurement to the success of the Corps indicate that potential problems are present and must be resolved. Additionally, ceasing to use the selective service draft system is further cause for reviewing officer accession in an all-volunteer environment in an effort to circumvent problem areas before they become major obstacles.

Since the President's announcement that the Armed Forces of the United States will not use the draft after July 1973, the military services face certain personnel procurement problems which have not been a factor since 1940.<sup>2</sup> After the draft system was established in 1940, the services basically established manpower requirements and these requirements were filled with draftees if sufficient volunteers were not available. The one exception to this procedure for filling manpower requirements was during the period of March 1947-March 1948. During this period, the United

States was without a draft system and experienced its only attempt at a volunteer service in the last 32 years.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the period of the draft system, most officers appear to have been volunteers for military service, but many volunteered because of the pressure applied by the draft. These are referred to hereafter as draft motivated volunteers or draft motivated officers. Many of these draft motivated officers volunteered for officer programs which offered preferred duty in an officer status vis-a-vis a threatened drafted, enlisted status. Still other draft motivated volunteers applied for officer programs which provided conditional exemption from the draft or which removed them from the draft. Such programs were attractive because the programs allowed the individual to continue his college education and deferred the individual's reporting for active duty.<sup>4</sup> Attraction to programs providing conditional exemption or removal from the draft has been most noticeable during times of high draft pressure, i.e., national crisis or high military manpower demands.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of the potential cessation of the draft and the resulting lack of draft motivation, the military services will have to compete with each other and with civilian pursuits for the potential management and technical skills of the nation. With the ever increasing demand of the military services for highly efficient managers and the increasing requirement for highly qualified technical personnel, the success of the services in this competition for talent will largely determine the future effectiveness of the armed forces.<sup>6</sup> Lack of sufficient officer personnel in the



initial commissioned ranks will create not only a void there, but could easily create a void in later years at the higher ranks. Failure to retain adequate personnel beyond initial obligation will also create voids at the higher ranks and in the associated middle and higher management levels. Equally important and axiomatic, sufficient quality accessions and retentions throughout the officer structure will be necessary if the services are to maintain the leadership necessary for efficient, effective management and an adequate national defense.

Civilian college students are the military services' prime source for officers. At the same time that draft motivation ceases to be a factor stimulating officer accessions, these students are faced with some peer group opinions which tend to disavow military service in general and military careers in particular.<sup>7</sup> These peer group pressures are largely the result of an anti-military, anti-Vietnam sentiment which increased in the late 1960's and reached its peak in May 1970.<sup>8</sup> Although this influence is presently decreasing, it will undoubtedly be a factor in officer procurement for an undetermined future.

The problems surrounding the volunteer service were considered in 1970 by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission). This commission felt that these problems could be overcome and that an all-volunteer service was feasible. Since the report of that commission and the President's announcement of an intended volunteer service, there has been much controversy over the subject of an all-volunteer service and in many cases

complete dissatisfaction on the part of both military and civilian leaders. Some attempt to disprove the rationale of a volunteer service while others attempt to prove its correctness.

Nevertheless, whatever the outcome, the United States Marine Corps will find itself deeply involved in the all-volunteer service and in the associated problems of officer procurement. Although many members of the Corps have long prided themselves on the Corps' being a volunteer service, close examination reveals that many of the Corps' enlisted and officer personnel were draft motivated for one reason or another.<sup>9</sup> Now, with the threat of the removal of the draft, personnel accessions must come from true volunteers. The tasks involved in acquiring these accessions must be accomplished in competition with the other services as each service seeks both quantity and quality.

The Marine Corps officer accession requirements for the time frame 1972-1975 average 2100 per year. In 1976, the requirement will be 2250 and thereafter is expected to remain at that level. Therefore, Marine Corps planning is based on 2100-2200 officer accessions annually.<sup>10</sup> This study is limited to 85-88% of the annual officer accessions and involves a total input of 1850-1950 annual officer accessions. Officer producing programs represented in this study are the four major officer programs, the United States Naval Academy (USNA), the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), the Platoon Leaders Class (PLC), and the Officer Candidate Class (OCC).<sup>11</sup> If these four major programs can achieve their goals, the Corps is assured of most of the required quantity

accessions and will have the required quality leaders at all levels in the years ahead.

As a departure point for this study, a limited review of the Gates Commission will be presented. This review will include only those findings and recommendations which relate directly to this study and are primarily associated with subsequent criticism of the Commission. This examination will be accomplished in order that officer accession problem areas can be compared with the Gates Commission findings and recommendations. The study will not attempt to question the rationale of the findings or recommendations per se, but, accepting the pending CY 1973 zero draft and all-volunteer service as a reality, will attempt to find ways to make the volunteer service system work within the USMC officer accession programs. Criticisms of the Commission's report will be used where they stimulate solution, not hopelessness. Obstacles will be cited as points to avoid. Throughout, where possible, potential changes to current procedures or programs will be recommended if such will increase the quality or quantity of accessions. Concurrently, changes which might improve officer career motivation will be recommended.

This study will include a review of the armed forces and the Marine Corps in an all-volunteer environment. As matters of interest and in an effort to draw upon the problems of other nations in similar undertakings, some related historical examples of the experiences of the British and the Canadians will be presented. The problems involving lack of draft motivation as

related to volunteers will be considered and the effects these are forecast to have on USMC officer accessions will be discussed. Additionally, peer group pressures concerning civilian pursuits vs military service and careers will be examined. These peer group pressures will be considered in relationship to college campus attitudes and the competition with civilian industry or businesses for the services of the potential officer.

The four major USMC officer accession programs will be reviewed to determine entrance qualifications and motivation of the candidates. Also included in this review will be a comparison of program quotas and applications, training received, commissioning procedures, and problems involved in related areas.

Similarly, the procurement procedures and related problems for the four major accession programs will be discussed. This will consider placing the best qualified candidate in the most appropriate program and placing a qualified candidate in another program if his first choice program quota is filled.

Lastly, other selected armed forces programs and suggestions will be reviewed in an effort to profit from the experiences of these programs. Where appropriate, lessons learned from these programs will be submitted as recommended changes to USMC programs and procedures.

## CHAPTER I

### FOOTNOTES

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## CHAPTER II

### THE GATES COMMISSION STUDY

In his address to the Congress of the United States on January 28, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon proposed an all-volunteer force and announced that the armed forces should reach zero draft by July 1, 1973.<sup>1</sup> This announcement was undoubtedly one result of recommendations of the Gates Commission. In February 1970, the Commission, in a report to the President, submitted its recommendation for an all-volunteer force by June 30, 1971. However, the Gates Commission recommended a standby draft system which would be activated by request of the President and with the consent of the Congress.<sup>2</sup>

In his instructions to the Commission, the President did not appear to be seeking an answer to the advisability of an all-volunteer service. Instead, he tasked the Commission to find ways through which an all-volunteer service could be achieved.

I have directed the Commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force.<sup>3</sup>

It is interesting to compare the President's instructions with his previously stated position on the subject. In 1956, as Vice-President, he stated in an address to the American Legion a personal desire to maintain military services without a draft but emphasized the continuing need for a draft.<sup>4</sup>

The findings and recommendations of the Gates Commission have been the subject of much criticism from both civilian and military

personnel. Accepting its rather positive charge from the President, the Gates Commission approached its task in a like manner and presented only the most favorable, optimistic examples and situations for consideration. In so doing, the Commission overlooked or misinterpreted some facts which otherwise could have altered the means of accomplishment if not the endorsement of an all-volunteer service. This has been a primary criticism of the Commission's report, and examples of such presentations and misinterpretations are herein cited.

The Commission did not have an assigned service force strength upon which to base its recommendations. Therefore, it used alternative force strength objectives which covered the broad total range of 2 to 3 million men.<sup>5</sup> However, this produced additional problems since the inducements required for military service are directly related to the size of the force desired. In 1966, a DOD report indicated that the cost of sustaining an adequate all-volunteer force of 2.7 million men would be prohibitive.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, one study prepared for the Commission stated that the military pay scales required for up to and including 2.5 million men were not the same as those required for a higher force strength. Further, that study indicated that pay scales for higher force strengths would be disproportionate above the 2.5 million men force strength.<sup>7</sup> This was emphasized by the fact that an increase of .5 million men from a 2.5 million level to 3.0 million would require an estimated increase from \$2.24 billion to \$4.62 billion or 106.2% dollar increase for a 20% man strength increase.<sup>8</sup> Although these facts

are contained in the report, they are not readily apparent, and as previously mentioned, the report primarily highlights the more favorable 2.5 million men force strength costs.

In determining the future needs of the total officer corps, the Commission used a 1964 DOD study and a 1967 DOD study to present respective 88.7% and 81.1% officer corps volunteer rates.<sup>9</sup> Using the same rationale used in computing the 1964 and 1967 percentage rates, the Commission stated that, at the time of the Gates study, over 70% of the total officer personnel were beyond their obligated period of service and were therefore, considered career officers.<sup>10</sup> Although this rationale would have been most valid if such officers were considered as volunteers vis-a-vis career officers, it did not actually establish a relationship to the percentage of career officers within the volunteers. Additionally, it did not show the relationship of those volunteers to their incentives. For example, the 1967 group was engaged in fighting a war, and this war was not yet the cause or subject of large scale dissidence amongst the U.S. civilian population.

Just as these percentages were reported in their most favorable manner, so was the Commission's assumption concerning the retention rates of officers. For example, in determining expected retention rates of officers, the Commission stated, "at least 80 out of every 100 Academy graduates can be expected to remain beyond their obligated period of service."<sup>11</sup> Although in the short term this appears true, close examination of academy graduate records does not support this from a career standpoint. An examination of



U.S. Naval Academy graduate records for the classes 1949-1967 indicate that within three years of fulfilling initial obligation the class retention rate drops to approximately 70% and rapidly stabilizes at 60-65% thereafter.<sup>12</sup> This has been substantiated as a valid career indicator for current USNA classes.<sup>13</sup>

Although recognizing an increasing difficulty in obtaining officers for military service, the Commission estimated that by the mid 1970's only 7% of all college graduates would be required to fill the services' needs.<sup>14</sup> The Commission estimated that this low percentage rate would be due to the increased student and graduate population in that time frame and not to a decreasing need by the services. Using this estimate, the Commission apparently, but erroneously, discounted the officer procurement problem with an increase in student and graduate population.

Fortunately for officer procurement, the number of freshmen in 1975 is estimated to be 57% above the 1965 level.<sup>15</sup>

Increased student and graduate population and a result in lower percentage rate of graduates required to fill the services' requirements will ease the procurement problems surrounding quantity of officer accessions. This easement is a result of providing a larger base from which to draw accessions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that an answer to the quality of officer accession problems will be provided only if the military services can successfully attract 7% of the graduates in a competitive labor market. Even if successful in filling accession quotas, the services will by no means be guaranteed an answer to the problems surrounding

quality of accession. This can be answered only by appealing to the desired 7%. In any case, in view of the current upward trend of the student's college costs and the possible resulting leveling or downward trend of college enrollments, the Commission's estimate may have been overly optimistic for both quantity and quality accessions.

The Commission recommended increased utilization of civilians in lieu of military manpower and stated that such increase should be above the levels projected by DOD.<sup>16</sup> The Commission further supported lateral hiring in specialty fields.<sup>17</sup> These recommendations are not without foundation and in some situations or environments have much merit. Although such a procedure would release some personnel for combat training, in so doing, the services would lose some training base in fields where skills filled by civilians were combat related, i.e., crash-rescue fire fighters, control tower operators, etc. Lateral hiring would prohibit training some individuals to operate throughout the military spectrum. For example, it would work in the case of a lawyer, but would have doubtful merit in the case of an aviation technician required to perform in his trade and at the same time required to be prepared to defend his position against the enemy. Both the matters of civilianization and lateral hiring highlight a still greater deficiency in the report, i.e., the report does not isolate the problem of obtaining combat troops.

The Commission assumed that the problems involved in maintaining a volunteer officer corps in the Army would be the most

difficult of all services and that as a result anything which would benefit Army procurement would solve the problems of the other services.<sup>18</sup> This rationale was most noticeable in its reference to pay scales.

If the level of officer compensation is high enough to meet Army accession requirements, it will also be adequate for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.<sup>19</sup>

Although in matters related to pay, there possibly was not another available method, establishing all standards of requirements for one service and expecting them to apply across the board to other services is the same as saying, "What's good for Ford is good for General Motors." Obviously, there is a relationship between the needs of the services, but it is not necessarily a one for one relationship. The Commission would have been more constructive had it prepared its report with the needs of each service considered individually. In an all-volunteer service, each of the services in competing for personnel assets must consider their needs separately and procure accordingly.

In making comparisons between military and civilian pay scales, the Commission found that both basically equated, but the Commission did not consider the hours a person was required to perform.<sup>20</sup> Neither did the Commission adequately report findings and recommendations in the fringe benefits, i.e., housing, family allowances, post exchange, medical care, etc.

Many of the Commission's assumptions, findings, and recommendations on the surface appear valid. On closer examination, it

is apparent that needs of the services are most often individual service needs. For that reason, the Commission's findings and recommendations must be reviewed from a USMC standpoint if one is to apply them to USMC officer procurement.

## CHAPTER II

### FOOTNOTES

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7. Harry J. Gilman, "The Supply of Volunteers to the Military Services," in Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force Vol I (1970), ed. by William H. Mackling, p. II-1-18.
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## CHAPTER III

### THE ARMED FORCES AND THE MARINE CORPS IN A VOLUNTEER SERVICE

#### Historical Summary of Recent Events

Although the history of compulsory military service extends throughout the nation's past, the current system is basically a product of the Selective Service Act of 1940 and subsequent legislation. In the immediate years prior to World War II, the United States maintained an all-volunteer service. After the Selective Service Act of 1940 was implemented, the military services relied upon conscription to build their force strength. Approximately 15 months later, this act was renewed, but only after much Congressional debate. This act provided the authority for conscription and remained in effect throughout World War II. It expired in March 1947 when President Truman decided to attempt to return to the volunteer service concept. For the next year, the services attempted, without success, to fill manpower requirements with volunteers, and President Truman requested the Congress to reinstate the Selective Service system. This was accomplished and a form of conscription has remained in effect since that time.<sup>1</sup>

The Gates Commission was by no means the first United States study group to examine the advisability and feasibility of a volunteer armed force. Since the end of World War II, conscription as a means of filling the military services' manpower requirements has been the subject of much debate. Of the three major studies

conducted in recent years, the Gates report was unique in its support of the feasibility of a volunteer service.

In 1966, both the Clark Panel, a Congressional, all-volunteer service study group, and the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (Marshall Commission), appointed by the President, recommended continuation of the draft system and recommended against a volunteer service due to the inflexibility and expense involved.<sup>2</sup> In the years following the reports of the Clark Panel and the Marshall Commission, the political and public attitudes concerning conscription and the military services changed. The change undoubtedly influenced President Nixon in his decision to seek an all-volunteer force. By 1969, this change was basically a result of a growing public anti-military, anti-Vietnam sentiment and of a growing public dissatisfaction with apparent unfair draft practices.<sup>3</sup> These influences were such a formidable force that their effects still remain a hindrance to manpower accessions even though many efforts and changes have since transpired.

Sharply decreased public support is eating away the manpower base the armed forces require for existence. Last year, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said that getting and keeping good men has become "the most serious problem that we have."  
Edward E. DeLong, Pittsburg Press (16 March 1971)

Although the political climate and lack of public support for the military and the draft appeared to be the basis for the decision to cease using the draft and form an all-volunteer force, the President's announcement of his intentions did not end the controversy. Supporters for both the volunteer service and the



conscription system remained adamant in their positions. Still others voiced doubt or objections without presenting solutions or support for either system.

What reasonable young man is going to give up a life of drinking beer with his friends, enjoying drive-in movies with his girl, and sleeping late on weekends in order to volunteer for a hard, rigorous life of running 20 miles a day, standing watch half the night, crawling through jungles and generally being miserable?<sup>5</sup> Rep. Paul N. McCloskey (R., Calif.)

An all-volunteer Army makes little patriotic impact on the more affluent members of our society, and an all-volunteer Army drawing a 'going rate' of pay reduces an enlistment to a 'job' instead of a 'service' to our country.<sup>6</sup> General Bruce Clark, U.S. Army, Retired.

Yet, I would challenge any of the proponents of a volunteer Army to travel to college campuses, as I have, to ask for volunteers. Nearly all raised their hands when I asked how many favored a volunteer army, but there were almost none who kept their hands up when I asked: 'Would you volunteer?'<sup>7</sup> Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.)

Although the arguments for and against conscription and the volunteer service continue, the services in general have accepted the volunteer concept and are acting to implement a volunteer service. General W. C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, set the Army's course by stating, "The Army of the United States has committed itself to moving toward a volunteer force with imagination and full energy."<sup>8</sup> Since 1951, the Army has been unable to fill its manpower requirements without resorting to the draft, but the other services have been, from time to time, draft motivated all-volunteer services. Now that the Army accepts the all-volunteer concept in practice and deed, the other services can no longer

rely upon draft motivated volunteers.<sup>9</sup>

#### Comparison with Canadian and British Experiences

A comparison of the Canadian and British volunteer service systems presents some beneficial suggestions concerning officer procurement in such systems. It should be noted that these countries do not maintain force strengths comparable to those of the United States and that comparisons can only serve as beneficial suggestions vis-a-vis guides or outlines for success or failure. For example, if Canada's international commitments and force strength were equated to its population and to that of the United States, Canada's armed force would be 350% larger than that presently maintained. In such cases, it would be unlikely that Canada could maintain such a force in a volunteer procurement environment. Under such circumstances, Canada's experience might be entirely different.<sup>10</sup>

Canada has maintained a small, highly professional force and has found that in so doing it has been necessary to be highly selective, attracting personnel who are capable of handling "the newest and most sophisticated equipment. For that caliber, the forces have to compete with private industry."<sup>11</sup> As stated by General Frederick R. Sharp, Chief of the Defense Staff, there are also retention problems involved in this competition. "After we get through training a man, we have to compete with private industry to hold him."<sup>12</sup> Canada's officer procurement program has been relatively successful and its success is mostly attributed to the

government's salary policies and the services providing professional challenges and opportunities.<sup>13</sup> These experiences imply that the military service must be prepared in all respects to procure and retain its officers in competition with private industry.

The British have experienced increasing difficulty in attracting qualified young career officers to the Army. In 1971, the British equivalent of the U.S. Military Academy, Sandhurst, had nearly 400 vacancies while attracting only 510 cadets. British difficulties appear to result from anti-military sentiment, British youth rejecting regimentation, and high physical and mental standards which cause 50% of volunteers to be rejected.<sup>14</sup> Successful cases of officer procurement appear to be due to attractions of travel and adventure, responsibility at a young age, comradeship (not readily available in civilian industry), the British military regimental system's association with family and community, educational opportunities, and favorable pay and allowances.<sup>15</sup> The favorable pay and allowances were an aftermath of a 1966 inadequate pay raise and a subsequent raise which made military pay completely competitive with private industry.<sup>16</sup> The British are optimistic about future officer procurement, but this optimism is based primarily on the government's priority attention to defense matters.<sup>17</sup>

The British experiences reinforce the position stated by Senator Barry Goldwater in his recommendations concerning a volunteer service.

We must make military service attractive and profitable enough to attract volunteers with a

desire to serve their country. We no longer can expect young men, no matter how patriotic to exist on poor pay or put up with inadequate housing facilities. The gap is too great when measured against benefits they would enjoy if they were working outside the military.<sup>18</sup>

#### Effects of Removing Draft Pressures

One group research conducted at the U.S. Naval War College concluded "that many present career officers would not now be in the service had it not been for the initial exposure to service life induced by the draft."<sup>19</sup> Such a conclusion is further supported by U.S. Marine Corps officer procurement program experience in 1942. In February 1942, officer procurement teams began visiting college campuses. These teams were welcomed by educators, but the students, although friendly, were not overly responsive to the teams' efforts. As draft pressures became more apparent to the students, the "wall of indifference" which these teams had faced gave way. By late 1942, the procurement teams were able to acquire sufficient candidates for officer programs.<sup>20</sup>

Under an all-volunteer service concept, the crucial question is as asked by David E. Rosenbaum in a New York Times article of February 1971. Will sufficient college men volunteer without the influence of a draft?<sup>21</sup> A 1964 DOD study concluded that 41.3% of all officer accessions were reluctant volunteers, draft motivated volunteers.<sup>22</sup> This is not surprising since 80% of the total officer corps come from college sources and this source is generally and historically motivated by the draft.<sup>23</sup> Student response to draft pressures was amply displayed within Marine Corps procurement

programs in 1963-1966. In September 1963, after President Kennedy deferred married men, response to USMC commissioning programs was substantially reduced. In 1965, when young married men lost deferment status, requests for USMC commissioning programs rapidly increased.<sup>24</sup> The Army's experience in this area has been similar. In 1969, there was a 27% decrease in Army ROTC enrollment due in part to lower draft pressures.<sup>25</sup> This drop was readily recognized by a recent Army publication which states that ROTC recruiting will become more difficult as draft pressures decrease and that the Army must compensate for this effect by advertising its officer procurement programs and by recruiting minority groups.<sup>26</sup>

#### Effects of Peer Group Pressure

A recent survey of Professors of Military Science at colleges with NROTC indicated that there was a greater anti-military feeling on campus than a similar survey of students indicated. This same survey indicated that if an all-volunteer service were implemented, the NROTC programs would be in serious trouble because of a lack of applicants or retention of sufficient personnel within the program. These potential shortages of personnel were attributed to the absence of draft pressure and peer group pressure acting against the program.<sup>27</sup> Peer group pressure has long been recognized as a strong force in the action of students. With the current peer group pressure acting against the officer procurement programs, this pressure must be either overcome or changed if officer procurement programs are to enjoy continued success on the campus. Basically, this

pressure can be changed if the services can develop a national pride in the military services and successfully depict a military career as a desirable profession equal to careers in industry. As expressed by Admiral T. H. Moore, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "And above all, we must eliminate the anti-military sentiment that demeans the uniform and works in opposition to the goal we seek."<sup>28</sup>

A recent survey at the University of Michigan indicates a basic student lack of knowledge of the military service and this is undoubtedly an underlying cause of the successful growth of the anti-military sentiment on the campuses.<sup>29</sup> General Westmoreland has stated that the "American people must understand and appreciate military service. And they must provide the encouragement that motivates young men to choose the military service."<sup>30</sup> This is an assessment of the problem, but it does not provide the solution per se. The solution must be service actuated by an educational and advertising program which will give the public the facts without the ill effects normally associated with propaganda. Perhaps then all services can attract volunteers because "people have pride in the armed forces."<sup>31</sup>

Another form of peer group pressure is that associated with the attractiveness of the military career vs the private industry career. If the military services are to recruit sufficient officers, then the services must be prepared to do so on a competitive basis with industry.

Private employers who seek high efficiency, low turn over, and promotable potential have long ago

discovered the advantages of competitive and even supercompetitive starting rates, of rationally designed internal wage and salary structures, and of fringe benefits as retention devices.<sup>32</sup>

The military services do not have as much leeway as industry in wage variations. Nevertheless, this could be accomplished partly by lateral hiring in much the same manner as has been done in the past with doctors. Similarly, maximum use of early promotions would have a retention wage variation effect such as found in industry. Fringe benefits, normally associated with cash savings or benefits such as medical or exchange benefits, could easily be expanded to include educational opportunities, duty assignments, etc. For example, if a marine officer desired assignment to Europe as a condition for remaining in service, then such assignment should be considered as a fringe benefit. Above all, in considering the request, it should not be considered tantamount to bribery but rather as that officer's "price" for remaining with the "firm". Just as in industry, the request should be granted or denied on the basis of that officer's value to the service, if the "price" is right for the potential service expected of the officer, and on the desirability of retaining that officer's services. Although the example may seem extreme, the relationship to other similar situations nevertheless applies, and the example is not unique in the experiences of the author.

Effects on U.S. Marine Corps Officer  
Accessions and Retentions

Throughout the services and in research material, one is faced with the fait accompli of eventual implementation of an all-volunteer service. At the same time, one is also faced with officers who are still fighting the concept or who ignore the practical requirements of preparing for the implementation of the volunteer service. These officers are in effect "spinning wheels" and hindering progress.

The U.S. Army has officially accepted the volunteer Army as a goal. As the only service historically dependent upon the draft, the Army has had attention focused on the problems associated with the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA). However, the other services are faced with similar problems because a draft will not be present to create draft motivated officers or draft motivated volunteers. The Marine Corps is faced with recruiting officers in both quantity and quality while maintaining its accession quotas and entrance standards. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., has stated the Corps' position and problem.

Of personnel procurement in general he forecast that "We'll get the numbers we need, but we must have a balance with quality." To get the quality the Corps desires "will take concentration and imaginative recruiting."<sup>33</sup>

We've had a bit of trouble in officer candidate procurement because of the lack of draft pressure.<sup>34</sup>

Even with draft pressure, the Marine Corps did not achieve its officer accession quotas for 1964-1971.<sup>35</sup> If the draft is to be reduced to zero by July 1973, as indicated in the Secretary of



Defense policy statement, then the Marine Corps must find means to counter the adverse effect that the lack of a draft will have on officer accessions.<sup>36</sup> Without a draft, the military services will no longer enjoy a "buyers' market" in officer procurement as referred to by Stuart H. Altman and Alan E. Fechter in their study on military manpower procurement in the absence of a draft.<sup>37</sup> Without a draft pressure, it will take maximum effort and new procurement methods to achieve the set goals.

### CHAPTER III

#### FOOTNOTES

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## CHAPTER IV

### THE FOUR MAJOR USMC OFFICER PROGRAMS

Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland in their book, Education and Military Leadership, state that the armed forces' officers must have not only quality traditional military attributes and skills and the expected qualities of character, loyalty, dedication, patriotism, and leadership, but also technical competence, breadth of outlook, judgment, and wisdom.<sup>1</sup> The four major U.S. Marine Corps officer programs strive to acquire officers with these traits by drawing officer accessions from the resources of the nation's college and university graduates.

The United States Naval Academy (USNA) program provides for commissioning in the Marine Corps of up to 16% of each graduating class. The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) program allows for commissioning certain NROTC midshipmen (Marine option students) upon graduation. Through the Platoon Leaders Class program (PLC), college graduates who participated as college students in the PLC program are commissioned. The Officer Candidate Class program (OCC) recruits college graduates or persons enrolled in the last year of college programs terminating in a baccalaureate degree. After graduation, OCC candidates attend a 12 week precommissioning program and are commissioned upon successful completion of the program. These four programs are expected to produce 85-88% of the Marine officer accessions in an all-volunteer service.<sup>2</sup> The USNA

program has the longest affiliation with the Corps, dating from 1883 when the first USNA graduates were commissioned in the Corps.

Until the late 1920's, commissioning of enlisted personnel was the method of acquiring the largest number of officer accessions, military colleges and universities with advanced ROTC ranked second, and the USNA ranked third. During the depression years of the early 1930's, civilians were not commissioned and the USNA and non-commissioned officer ranks provided the officers of the Corps. In 1935, the PLC program commenced and was an immediate success in its appeal to adventuresome applicants. In 1936, 95 civilians were commissioned, followed by 136 the next year. The first officer candidate class convened at Quantico, Virginia, in November 1940. As previously mentioned, marine procurement teams had some procurement difficulties on campuses in early 1942. These difficulties were amplified by the fact that the Army was assigned first choice in selections from schools with ROTC programs, the Navy had first option at schools with NROTC, and the Marine Corps was confined in its procurement to campuses where neither ROTC nor NROTC was established.

By 1946, with the reduction of the Corps' force strength, the Academy was the prime contributor to officer accessions. Although NROTC was making some contributions, the results were generally disappointing. The PLC program started making significant contributions in 1949 and currently accounts for 36% of the total accession.<sup>3</sup> This program is planned to produce 56% of the future annual accessions.<sup>4</sup>

### United States Naval Academy

The Naval Academy and NROTC programs combined currently produce 12% of the Corps' officer accession. This is expected to increase to 20% in the near future. During 1970 and 1971, the Academy graduated 103 and 117 officers who were commissioned in the Marine Corps. These represented 12.3% and 12.8% respectively of the graduating classes of 1970 and 1971.<sup>5</sup> Currently, 120 midshipmen are scheduled to be graduated and commissioned in the Corps in June 1972. These 120 midshipmen represent 13% of the class of 1972 and are 3% less than the 16% authorized to be commissioned in the Corps.<sup>6</sup> Over the years, the number annually commissioned has increased as has the percentage of the graduating class, i.e., the 35 commissioned in 1946 represented 4.6% of the graduating class.<sup>7</sup>

Basically, USNA midshipmen are not draft motivated volunteers, but this doesn't mean that all of them are careerist.<sup>8</sup> Although several studies indicate USNA graduate retention rates as high as 75-80%, these estimates are excessively high for those USNA graduates in the Corps.<sup>9</sup> From the Classes 1958-1964, the Corps retrained 61.5%. Noteworthy is that the Classes 1962, 1963, and 1964 have Marine Corps declining retention rates of 59%, 51%, and 45% respectively.<sup>10</sup>

Estimates for retention rates of those classes currently at the Academy are not expected to surpass those of the past and there are no new programs foreseen which would indicate future increases.<sup>11</sup> The Marine Corps quotas for the Classes 70, 71, and 72 were not filled.<sup>12</sup> In the case of the Class of 1972, there are 28 vacancies.<sup>13</sup>

Midshipmen are exposed to the Marine Corps as a service during a short period of their Second Class Summer Cruise (summer prior to commencement of second class, junior year). At this time, midshipmen visit the Basic School at Quantico. This visit misrepresents the Corps because the Basic School is essentially an academic, training environment vis-a-vis an operational environment. As such, the midshipmen form false conclusions concerning the Corps as compared with the Navy. Currently, the Navy desires to cancel the Quantico visit and substitute a midshipmen amphibious landing exercise at Little Creek, Virginia. Marine Corps officers at the Academy feel that training and exposure with the Second Marine Division and the Second Marine Aircraft Wing at Camp LeJeune, Cherry Point, and MCALF Bogue Field, N. C. would be more appropriate.<sup>14</sup>

This year's service selection at the USNA had one highly successful Marine Corps' factor. Eight of the twelve black midshipmen in the Class elected to be commissioned in the Corps. Their motivation appears to be based on a desire to emulate an outstanding black marine officer currently stationed at the Academy. This reflects highly on the Corps and the officer concerned, but even more it highlights a motivational factor too often overlooked. It is necessary to have midshipmen (or any other potential officer) associated with outstanding officers whom they might attempt to emulate.<sup>15</sup> Some midshipmen on this past year's summer cruise were associated with some marine junior officers who allegedly displayed a lack of career or job motivation. As a result, the midshipmen were adversely affected by the Corps' representatives.<sup>16</sup> Real or



unreal, such adverse displays are often the one factor making the difference in service selection.

The Marine Corps' pulling out of Vietnam has had a good effect on the midshipmen's opinions of the Corps, but this has been counter-balanced by a lack of attraction to a peacetime Corps. Midshipmen indicate a distaste for Corps' options for duty, peacetime Marine Corps training, and their view of a spartan marine family life.<sup>17</sup> This correlates with a recent Army study of junior officer attitudes which indicated that family life and personal comforts rank very high amongst college graduates.<sup>18</sup>

The Marine officer interviewed at the Academy stated that midshipmen highly approve of the Corps' approach to recruiting, i.e., "a few good men," but that they don't feel that the Corps tells all the facts in its recruiting or procurement programs.<sup>19</sup> This corresponds to a similar statement made to the author by some officer procurement personnel. When asked what the response of college students was to Marine Corps recruiting and procurement, they stated that advertising programs made marines glad to be marines, but that it had little effect on officer procurement.<sup>20</sup> The fact most effective in officer procurement appears to be the example of an individual marine whom one desires to emulate.

The Navy surface line is a major competitor for the type of midshipmen who have historically selected the Corps. Navy line is currently assigning only the most outstanding junior officers to the Academy and their example is noteworthy. Again, it is a matter of emulation. Academy officials are assisting Marine Corps officers

in their procurement program and both are working jointly to insure retention in the Naval Service rather than accession into a particular service.<sup>21</sup>

There is evidence that the Corps as a whole is not pushing the Academy as an officer accession program. In a class of 1319 members, the Class of 1975 has only 17 members with prior association with the Corps via family and only 2 members with prior active duty enlisted USMC service. This compares with 269 associated by family with other services and 118 with prior active duty Navy service or Naval Reserve active duty. The rising Class of 1976 appears to be in similar shape. The Naval Academy Preparatory School has 3 marine students preparing for the Class of 1976 as compared with 185 Navy students. Upon initial entry into the school there were 5 marines as compared with 248 navy personnel. There were approximately 8 students who were immediate relatives of marines.<sup>22</sup> It is apparent that the Corps and Marines in general must encourage attendance at the Academy as an officer program if the Corps is to receive full benefit from this officer source. This is a direct procurement method within control of the Corps. An indirect method is the time honored one of individual marines seeking outstanding young men, military and civilian, and encouraging them to apply for entrance to the Academy as both a means to an education and a career. Many such young men if ultimately graduated from the Academy will undoubtedly return to the Corps in their efforts to emulate their "sponsor". As stated by the senior marine representative at the Academy, "Just having a few more confirmed Marines in the brigade

would help immeasurably."<sup>23</sup>

#### Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps

During FY 70 and FY 71, NROTC (marine option) produced less than 50% of the authorized officer accession quota assigned. Similarly, although projected to have some immediate large increases in production, the program is not anticipated to produce 100% of its assigned quota in the foreseeable future. Retention rates for the regular NROTC program (scholarship) averaged 30% for year groups 58-64.

Contract NROTC (nonscholarship) retention rates averaged 16.3% for the same period. It is noteworthy that contract retention rates increased for year groups 62, 63, and 64. Navy financial costs of the scholarship program compared to the nonscholarship program are \$12,841 per graduate to \$5,703 per graduate. On a dollar vs retention rate basis, the contract program produces the most for the money. By comparison, the Academy costs per graduate are \$42,239, making it by far the most expensive of all programs.

In the past, Marine option NROTC midshipmen basically followed the standard NROTC program. Their attendance at a 6 week training course at Quantico during their final college summer was the only difference in the program. In 1972, the Corps started sharing responsibility for recruiting personnel for the NROTC program. As a result, marine option students are identified during their first college year instead of their third year. In the future, the NROTC program quota and the Naval Academy quota will combine to form 20% of the Corps' annual officer accessions.<sup>24</sup> Because of the monetary

advantages received by the NROTC midshipmen, the zero draft is not expected to have much influence on the NROTC program. In fact, even though the NROTC projections do not forecast the USMC officer accession quotas to be filled by 1976, the quota is expected to be 92% filled in 1976 as compared with 43.5% in 1971.<sup>25</sup> The primary reasons for this increase are credited to increased Marine Corps' activity in recruiting its own NROTC students and to the increasing financial advantages of the scholarship as college tuitions increase. As in the case of the USNA program, the individual marine can be a major recruiting factor by seeking young men who are likely prospects for the NROTC program. In this respect, every marine, officer or enlisted, is a recruiter. The prospects for this program's success appear to be excellent.

#### Officer Candidate Course

The Officer Candidate Course (OCC) in the recent past has been the highest producer of officer accessions (37%). It is a highly draft motivated program and shows much less potential in an all-volunteer environment. As a result, the Corps plans to acquire only 10% of its future officers from this source. The OCC program is one of the least expensive, but it also has the lowest retention rate. The program is divided into three elements, Officer Candidate Course (for potential ground officers), Aviation Officer Candidate (AOC), and Naval Flight Officer Candidate (NFO). Candidates who successfully complete the 12 weeks precommissioning training at Quantico are commissioned and assigned for further training. Ground

officers attend the 26 week Basic School at Quantico; the AOC graduates are assigned as student naval aviators to flight training at Pensacola, Florida; and the NFO graduates attend Naval Flight Officer training courses at Pensacola and Glynnco, Georgia.

The advantages of the OCC program are low costs per officer, responsiveness in a high draft environment to the Corps' needs in a short lead time, and ease of expansion under mobilization conditions. The primary disadvantage is that the program is directly related to draft pressures and that it is not expected to produce accessions in an all-volunteer environment in quantities proportionate to its past draft motivated history.<sup>26</sup>

Officer procurement in an all-volunteer environment will require imagination and competitive recruiting. The AOC program meets these prerequisites with its branch program, Aviation Officer Candidate (Scholarship) program. This program is the same as the OCC or AOC program except that the entrance age is reduced to a maximum of 24. Education requirements are reduced from being a college graduate to possessing the equivalent of 60 semester hours, with at least a 2.0 average on a 4.0 grade scale. Service obligation for the successful graduate of the program is 3½ years after completion of flight training. At the end of initial obligation, individuals may elect release from active duty or request assignment to the College Degree program. Individuals assigned to the College Degree Program acquire an additional 3 years obligation if the degree is earned in less than 12 months and an additional 4 year obligation if the degree is earned in 12-21 months. The program has an obvious appeal to

candidates who are primarily interested in flying.<sup>27</sup>

Dr. Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale, in the April 1970 issue of Current, proposes an allowed break in one's formal college education and an easy reentry into the educational system at a later time. This educational break would allow the college student to approach his final undergraduate education with a realization of its value to him as an individual rather than as a forced academic consumption required as an end product of an academic commitment.<sup>28</sup> A program such as the AOC (Scholarship) would compliment the recommendation of Dr. Brewster.

A similar program for ground officers which does not require a college degree, has been formulated by Headquarters Marine Corps and is currently being held in reserve in case it is required to increase officer accessions. A procurement officer at Headquarters Marine Corps stated to the author that Marine Corps procurement personnel have been warned that this program may be necessary within the coming year and that procurement personnel should take steps to prepare for its implementation. The idea of a ground officer commissioning program such as AOC (Scholarship) has merit. An OCC (Scholarship) would offer young men not interested in aviation an opportunity for commissioning without graduating from college. At the same time, the program, involving longer obligatory service, would tend to reinforce the individual's career motivation. Similarly, the Corps would have an opportunity to evaluate the individual's potential for higher rank and responsibility prior to investing larger sums of government money in his education.<sup>29</sup>

In both an AOC (Scholarship) and a potential OCC (Scholarship) program, a need exists for the advertisements and contracts involving the programs to be exact in every detail. Current advertising prepared for the AOC (Scholarship) program tends to be misleading and could lead an applicant to believe that acceptance as an AOC (Scholarship) candidate is tantamount to ultimate assignment to the College Degree Program. A Headquarters Marine Corps procurement officer has stated that final acceptance into the College Degree Program is dependent upon the individual officer's applying for the program, the officer's performance supporting assignment to the College Degree Program, and Headquarters Marine Corps' approval of the request.<sup>30</sup> In this case, the misleading advertisement could result in a dissatisfied officer who, denied his request for the College Degree Program, attempts to discredit the AOC (Scholarship) on a basis of false information being supplied to candidates. Presentation of all the facts in this case is in keeping with previous comments concerning the Corps' advertising program.

#### Platoon Leaders Class

The Platoon Leaders Class program (PLC) is divided into four programs, land, naval aviation, naval flight officer, and law. The PLC program provides 36% of the annual officer accessions.<sup>31</sup> Headquarters Marine Corps plans for this to increase to 58% in the future. This increase is necessary because of the lack of draft motivation in an all-volunteer environment and a resulting effort to place more reliability on programs less affected by the draft.<sup>32</sup>

In order to attract more PLC candidates, the Corps requested legislation, for monthly subsistence payments to students in the PLC program. Subsequently, this legislation passed as PL 92-172, and the payment of \$100 monthly is authorized for a maximum of 3000 students by 1976.<sup>33</sup>

During the time frame 1958-1964, the PLC program had an average retention rate of 62.5% for regular officers and 23.7% for reserve officers. At a cost of \$8,414 per commissionee, this is by far the best buy for the money of all the procurement programs. These costs will increase since subsistence pay is now authorized, but the program is still expected to return the best dividends for the money spent.<sup>34</sup>

College students enrolled full-time in a regionally accredited institution may apply for the PLC program. Students must be less than 28 years of age when commissioned (ground/law); less than 26 (naval aviator); less than 27 (NFO) and must maintain an overall "C" average while in college. Historically, 93% of all qualified applicants have been selected for the program.

Personnel selected accrue longevity for pay purposes from the date accepted into the program. There is no on-campus training involved in the program, and unless accepting subsistence pay, which is optional, there is no obligation until commissioned. Once commissioned, the individual acquires a 3 year active duty obligation if a ground officer, 3½ years after flight training if a naval aviator, and 3 years after aviation training if a NFO.<sup>35</sup> If accepting subsistence pay, individuals acquire a six month active



duty obligation for each part or whole school year during which financial assistance is received; for a maximum obligation of 54 months. If an individual receiving subsistence fails to be commissioned, he is obligated to serve two years active duty in an enlisted status.<sup>36</sup>

Students assigned to the PLC program attend two six week summer training sessions if enrolled as freshmen or sophomores. If enrolled as juniors, students attend one ten week training session. After commissioning, officers in ground, aviation, and NFO programs receive identical training given to OCC graduates upon commissioning. Officers selecting the law program are commissioned and are guaranteed a delay for active duty while obtaining a law degree.<sup>37</sup>

The PLC program receives a major part of the attention given to Marine Corps officer procurement. As a result, procurement problems are more readily apparent when one reviews the PLC program than other programs. Most of the problems related herein apply equally to other programs and are cited under the PLC program because the problems were surfaced while reviewing the PLC program.

Retention of PLC candidates is a problem if they are not obligated by receiving subsistence pay. Initially, it appeared that many students would refuse subsistence pay rather than acquire an obligation, and with the reduction of the draft pressure, there was concern over retention of candidates just for the immediate future. However, during February 1972, more students than anticipated accepted subsistence and acquired an obligation. If this

trend continues, it may be the first indication that the PLC program will be able to rapidly fill its ranks and fill the assigned officer accession quotas. It is too early to assume this, but by FY 74 as the effects of these accessions are realized in the active duty forces, a positive trend should be established for future planning.<sup>38</sup>

As another retention incentive, the Marine Corps has started a civilian pilot training program in conjunction with the PLC program. Under this program, the Corps will pay for pre solo instruction without obligation to the student. If the student desires to continue flying beyond solo, he can continue training until earning a private pilot's certificate. Beyond pre solo, the student must agree to accept a commission with a 3 year obligation and if he does not complete the PLC program, he must agree to serve on active duty for 2 years in an enlisted status.<sup>39</sup>

One of the major officer procurement problems involves the anti-military attitude on college campuses. No longer active aggression, this attitude manifests itself in passive hostility and the resulting adverse peer group pressure. To counter this adverse peer group pressure, procurement teams have resorted to indirect approaches in their efforts to contact potential candidates. For example, teams are rarely allowed to open booths or procurement offices in prime visibility positions on campus. Therefore, many teams now use mailing lists to initially advise students of career opportunities and programs available.<sup>40</sup>

Some procurement teams use educators or prominent civilians

with past Marine Corps association in locating potential candidates or in influencing students in their decisions.<sup>41</sup> Some teams have arranged to receive lists of personnel who have applied for other programs, who were fully qualified, but who were not accepted for their first choice program, i.e., USNA but not accepted due to quota filled. These lists are then used to provide the names of potential candidates who have expressed a desire for military association, and who possess known desirable qualifications.<sup>42</sup> All procurement personnel interviewed expressed a desire for such lists to be released from Headquarters Marine Corps or higher level and for such lists to include personnel who had applied for USNA, USMA, USAFA, USCGA, NROTC, etc. Basically, the procurement officer faces a problem of "beating the bushes" for qualified, desirable candidates. In "beating the bushes," he must use his imagination and initiative but he needs all the help and ideas he can get from a higher level.

Procurement personnel interviewed indicated that the vision standards for the PLC and OCC programs should be the same. Realizing the requirement to insure that an individual meets an acceptable standard at the time of commissioning, it was recommended that the PLC program lower its vision requirements from the present 20/100 correctable to 20/20 to the OCC program requirement of 20/200 correctable to 20/20. As an adjunction to this recommendation, it was further recommended that persons having less than 20/100 correctable to 20/20, but not less than 20/200 correctable to 20/20, be accepted with the proviso that at time of

commissioning at least 20/200 correctable to 20/20 will be required. Any person whose vision is reduced before commissioning below 20/200 correctable to 20/20 would be dropped from the program without obligation unless receiving subsistence pay. If receiving subsistence pay, the normal rules which apply if not commissioned would be effective.<sup>43</sup>

The Navy provides aircraft for orientation flights for potential naval aviation candidates, but some Marine Corps procurement personnel have been unable to get an equitable use of these aircraft. It was recommended that Officer Service Selection Officers have an aircraft on call within certain time frames or by reservation. This will facilitate timely processing potential aviation candidates while their interest is at its maximum. When possible, Marine naval aviators assigned to the College Degree Program could be used to fly these aircraft since they would be able to establish both a military and student rapport. In any event, the officer conducting the orientation flight should be highly selected both for aviation skill and as a Marine Corps representative.<sup>44</sup>

Officer procurement personnel should be acutely aware of the job and labor markets in industry. In a volunteer service, the military services are competing on an open labor market for the best possible talent. Officer procurement officers are not just filling quotas but are insuring the future of the Corps. In so doing, they must be capable of matching industrial personnel recruiters in their efforts. Marines assigned to procurement duty must be dedicated career marines who are representative of the

Corps' finest and who create the image that students desire to emulate. One interviewee told the author that he knew 3 black officer selection officers who intend to resign from the service.<sup>45</sup> When the Corps is in an all-out effort to procure officers, and especially talented black officers, it cannot afford the luxury of displaying officers who are resigning from the service, and again especially black officers.

There appears to be a need to appeal to the high school age group. Some procurement personnel felt that, while immediate dividends would not be seen, the long term gains would make an advertising campaign aimed at that age group worthwhile.<sup>46</sup> This will become even more important as the PLC program starts recruiting high school graduates prior to college entrance.<sup>47</sup>

Most procurement personnel interviewed agreed that the biggest need in the procurement program today is to present a challenge of a career to the young college student or graduate. If this is accomplished, the procurement programs will have a better chance of achieving their goals and the accession programs will have top quality candidates to train for tomorrow's Corps.

## CHAPTER IV

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## CHAPTER V

### LESSONS LEARNED BY ARMY ROTC

Despite apparent student and faculty dissidents on the campuses, the U.S. Army has maintained an excellent rapport with most of the colleges which have ROTC units on campus. This rapport is largely a result of the work of the U.S. Army and the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs.

This Advisory Panel is composed of distinguished educators and citizens who represent a wide cross-section of the nation and who are closely attuned to the country's political, economic, and educational moods. Others completing the membership of the Panel are military representatives from various Army commands and ROTC cadets from representative colleges of the nation. The Panel normally meets biannually to discuss problems related to the Army ROTC program and to seek conclusions and recommendations concerning these problems. In so doing, the Panel has been most effective, and the implementation of many of its recommendations has assisted the Army ROTC Program through some most difficult times in recent years.

At times when the ROTC program has been under attack from many sides, the Panel has maintained its perspective and has not been diverted from its task of making ROTC a creditable officer accession program which is challenging to the cadet and which meets the requirements of the academic community.

Student and faculty dissidents being a transitory phenomena, should not have any effect or influence on any new curriculum concepts or policies.<sup>1</sup>

One of the most innovative ideas to come from this Panel has been the Track C program. This program incorporates the academic requirements of the university with the needs of the Army. Basically, the program drops a large portion of the previous ROTC non-academic activities from the campus and reserves such activities for summer training camps, i.e., basic training courses, drills, etc. In place of these activities, cadets substitute academic courses which compliment their development as officers. For example, courses may be taken in the Political Science or History Department. Similarly, the Military Science Department presents courses which are qualified for academic credit and which are available to all students of the university. At Loyola of Chicago, the Department offers freshmen 2 semesters of "World Military History" and sophomores courses in "Foundations of National Power" or "National Security Problems."<sup>2</sup> The courses provide an excellent exchange of ideas between the military, cadets, and regular students and have developed a better understanding amongst all groups.

Realizing the necessity to improve the academic image of the Army officer and instructor, the Army assigns personnel with a minimum of a masters degree in Political Science or History to the Track C program.<sup>3</sup> These instructors are used in a cross exchange with the Political Science and History Departments, and as a result, expose cadets and other students alike to the Army, thereby increasing mutual understanding of each other. The program at

Loyola has been highly successful as evidenced by the Blue Key National Honor Fraternity, Loyola Chapter, presenting to the Professor of Military Science their annual honorary award.

He has transformed the military science department into a truly academic effort making Loyola a model for other schools' military science departments. The initiation of the 'Option C' program exemplifies the qualities of academic excellence and personal integrity needed of our future Army officers.<sup>4</sup>

Another Army ROTC innovation helping the procurement of students for the program involves using a selected mailing list which is obtained through arrangements with the American College Testing Program. In a recent year, over 300,000 letters were sent to parents of students explaining the ROTC program and the financial and career advantages available to ROTC cadets.<sup>6</sup> With the rising costs of college educations, this program is expected to have excellent results.

These are just a few examples of new ideas which have proved successful for Army ROTC. Perhaps the most imaginative and innovative of all is the formation of the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC affairs. It displays an Army interest in improving its image, maintaining a rapport with the academic world, and a willingness to experiment in searching for new ways to improve the Army's Officer Corps.

## CHAPTER V

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## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of the type of procurement system used, the officer corps is a crucial element in the effectiveness of any military establishment. An all-volunteer armed force must attract an adequate supply of officers from the limited number of individuals in the population who possess the necessary leadership qualities and motivation.<sup>2</sup> Gates Commission

#### General Conclusions

Despite all the criticisms which one might use against the Gates Commission report, the report nevertheless identifies the problem areas. However, the Commission's optimism and often resulting false assumptions cloud the issues involved in these problems. Similarly, the emotionalism and pessimistic arguments voiced by the Commission's opponents equally confuse the issues and problems. It is time for both sources of confusion to cease their ineffective criticisms; and it is time for all services and service members to recognize that the implementation of the all-volunteer force is close at hand. It is time for the services to be about their business in preparing for an all-volunteer force. This preparation must be accomplished in a pragmatic manner, recognizing the problem areas and issues and taking positive steps to overcome them.

In its preparation for an all-volunteer service, the Marine Corps must recognize its procurement problems and must take active steps to correct them. Unlike the experience of the Army, the

Marine Corps in general does not have a large vocal opposition or support for the all-volunteer service. The Corps is faced with a potentially greater problem, ignorance or apathy related to the concept and effects of an all-volunteer service. This ignorance or apathy is not located at Headquarters Marine Corps but rather among the officers of the Corps. To counteract this, the Marine Corps needs to conduct a low key educational program which will apprise all officers of their responsibilities in maintaining acceptable officer accessions and retentions in an all-volunteer service.

As the Marine Corps approaches the effects of a zero draft, competition for quantity and quality accessions will become increasingly difficult. Personnel policies should be designed to meet this problem well in advance of its occurrence. Procurement policies should be designed to meet the diminishing "buyers market" by the Corps' seeking the "sellers price". This does not mean meeting the demands of any and every candidate, but rather adopting a realistic approach in meeting the competition from other services as well as from industry.

Every officer is a potential recruiter. As evidenced by the shortage of Marine Corps affiliated candidates within certain accession programs, a better job could be done by the entire Corps in procuring personnel for the accession programs. One of the strongest motivational factors in procurement remains that of the candidate's desire to emulate another. Every officer should be advised of his responsibilities for procuring officers for the Corps and that by his example and efforts the Corps will succeed or fail.

The college campuses will continue to provide the best source of quality officer accessions. The Corps should maximize its efforts in this area. Officers assigned to procurement duty should be outstanding, highly motivated career officers. In areas of high student population, sufficient officers should be assigned to guarantee maximum exposure to students and to the public.

The Marine Corps has to maintain a favorable image before the public, and in officer procurement and accession programs before the students. Officers assigned to procurement or officer accession programs must be able to hold their own in an academic environment and should have a minimum of a college degree or preferably a masters degree. Officers should be assigned to this duty on a basis of their displayed academic ability as well as on their military officer qualifications.

In an effort to establish a rapport with the academic community, the Marine Corps should consider establishing a board or panel similar to the Army Advisory Panel on ROTC Affairs. It would not be necessary for such a panel to meet as often as the Army's panel, but meetings conducted at least once a year would allow the Corps to keep the nation's educators apprised of the Corps' goals. At the same time the Corps could be kept more aware of the problems on campus. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps should study the Army's Track C program to determine if such a program could be used in the Naval Service programs, i.e. NSOTC.

The publicity campaigns of the Marine Corps are effective in establishing public attitudes towards the Corps. The Corps should

continue its officer procurement advertising on and off campus. However, it is noted that the most effective advertisement is a successful, satisfied marine officer. Young, outstanding, Fleet Marine Force officers, in company of Officer Selection Officers, periodically visiting campuses and programs from which they graduated would greatly assist in spreading the word far more than any advertising campaign.

Procurement personnel are restricted by qualification standards which are not uniform throughout the various programs. Qualification standards need to be reviewed periodically to determine their continued applicability. This is particularly true in the case of the vision qualification standards of the PLC and OCC programs.

#### USNA and NROTC Associated Conclusions

The Naval Academy and NROTC programs provide excellent sources for quality accessions. In an effort to attract midshipmen to the Corps, only the Corps' outstanding officers should be assigned to duty with these programs. There is an urgent requirement for the Marine Corps to conduct aggressive recruiting programs within the Corps for highly qualified, motivated candidates for the Academy and NROTC. Similarly, officers should be asked to seek out and to encourage from amongst the Corps' families and local civilian families outstanding young men who might qualify for admission to the Academy or NROTC.



#### OCC Associated Conclusions

The OCC program provides a source of officers to fill those quotas not otherwise filled. This program should not be assigned a fixed quota of 10%, but rather the quota should be allowed to float with the needs of the Corps. Since the program historically has produced those least motivated for a career, this program should not be pushed excessively, thereby allowing Officer Selection Officers more time to concentrate on the biggest producer, PLC. However, an OCC (Scholarship) program needs to be implemented as additional incentive when the OCC program is required.

#### PLC Associated Conclusions

The PLC program should be the mainstay of the Marine Corps officer accession programs. Properly supervised, it can produce both quantity and quality. Although the PLC program is not a scholarship program as such, the Marine Corps should initiate active advertising of the PLC program concentrating on the \$100 monthly subsistence pay, the civilian pilot training afforded, and the longevity accrued while in the PLC program, thereby increasing earning power by approximately \$20,000 over a 20 year commissioned period. All of these factors add up to one of the military services' most attractive programs, either scholarship or non-scholarship.

#### Summary

The Marine Corps will have an advantage in preparing for officer procurement in an all-volunteer service. As a small elite unit with a proud history, it has an appeal to those only satisfied with

being a part of "a few good men". At the same time, the Corps can be selective in its procurement since its requirements are small when compared with those of other services. However, if the Corps remains satisfied with just these advantages and relies upon them to produce its officer accessions, then it is only a matter of time until the Corps will not be able to procure or retain a sufficient quantity or quality of officers. This appeal of the Corps must be continually revitalized; it must remain active.

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